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On the ‘‘Misogyny’’ of Jean-Jacques Rousseau: 
The Letter to d’Alembert in Historical Context 
Helena Rosenblatt 
Hunter College and the Graduate Center, CUNY 
  
 Evidence suggests that the feminist consensus on Jean-Jacques Rousseau “misogyny” 
is breaking down.1 New studies are emerging that bring to light the many sympathetic portrayals 
of women in Rousseau’s works and the important role he ascribed to women within the family. 
Some modern feminists are even ﬁnding ways of reading Rousseau that speak to women’s 
concerns today. Overturning the notion that Rousseau was an arch-misogynist will be an uphill 
battle, however, given how very widespread it has become. Moreover, before we can arrive at a 
coherent and convincing appraisal of Rousseau’s views on women, a curious paradox needs to 
be addressed: even feminist admirers of Rousseau tend to accept the established feminist canon 
on him, and in fact build upon it. Therein lies a fundamental problem for Rousseau scholarship 
and for women’s studies in general. 
Early works of feminist criticism not only exposed Rousseau’s patriarchal and 
“functionalist” attitude toward women but denounced it as the fatal ﬂaw in his entire political 
theory. According to Eva Figes, Rousseau’s attempt to “put woman ﬁrmly back in the home” was 
driven by a desire to repress the female sex and the related self-serving belief that a woman’s 
role should be conﬁned to providing domestic ‘‘entertainment’’ for men. This view of women 
was “ironic” and even “illogical” given Rousseau’s otherwise egalitarian principles; indeed, if 
taken to their logical conclusion, Rousseau’s ideas on women made “utter non-sense” of his whole 
political philosophy.2 Similarly, Susan Okin notes that Rousseau held to his ‘‘reactionary’’ ideas 
on women, at times with “almost hysterical fervor,” despite the fact that they were ‘‘in ﬂagrant 
contradiction’’ to his own values of freedom and equality.3 Other feminist critics thereafter 
picked up on this contradiction, the most damning of Rousseau’s many paradoxes: his 
advocation of a male-female relationship based on the legitimation of force and the cultivation 
of “corrupt doll-like sentiments” in women.4 Carole Pateman denounces Rousseau from yet 
another perspective: despite his diﬀerences with the thinkers of the natural law school, Rousseau 
nevertheless agreed with their view of women as “permanently subversive of political order” and 
enthusiastically subscribed to their notion of a “sexual contract” between men and women that 
doomed women to a condition resembling slavery.5 
                                                          
1 According to both Webster’s and the Oxford English Dictionary, misogyny means ‘‘hatred of women.’’ 
2 Figes, Patriarchal Attitudes (London, 1970), 94, 96, 99. 
3 Susan Okin, Women in Western Political Thought (Princeton, N.J., 1992), 99, 193. 
4 Nannerl Keohane, ‘‘ ‘But for Her Sex... ’: The Domestication of Sophie,’’ in Trent Rousseau Papers, ed. Jim 
MacAdam, Michael Neumann, and Guy Lafrance (Ottawa, 1980), 144. 
5Carole Pateman, The Disorder of Women: Democracy, Feminism, and Political Theory (Stanford, 
In France, Rousseau’s reputation did not fare any better. Léon Abensour’s often-cited 
study La femme et le féminisme avant la Révolution describes Rousseau as the “leader” and 
“chief” of the “anti-feminist school.” An outrageous disparager of woman, uniquely 
antifeminist for his times, Rousseau denied women “all capacity, all political right.”6 More 
recently, Sarah Kofman has done much to expose Rousseau’s so-called phallocratic ends, his 
“hackneyed and symptomatically masculinist” ideas about women.7 It is not surprising, then, 
given the considerable body of scholarship accumulated over the years, and the near unanimity 
about Rousseau’s “misogyny,” that feminists have continuously asked whether they should 
even bother to read him anymore. 
This view of Rousseau as arch-misogynist permeates other areas of scholarship as well. 
In fact, recent feminist historiography of the French Revolution has done much to propagate 
and reinforce it. In particular, those who have argued that the Revolution was bad for women 
have also often placed considerable blame for this on Rousseau. It is claimed that Rousseau 
provided the rationale for the exclusion of women from citizenship, for their “dismissal from 
political life,” their “banishment to the domestic sphere,” and their ultimate “silencing.”8 Carol 
Blum, for example, blames what she calls the “Jacobin-Rousseauvian male oligarchy” for 
depriving women of their rightful place in the new French polity.9 Joan Landes notes the 
“enormous” and “profound” impact of Rousseau’s misogynist ideas on the revolutionaries. In 
Rousseau’s work, women were “yoked to a conservative and ultimately passive function,” 
conﬁned to the privacy of their homes and thereby “barred completely from active  participation  
in  the  very  sphere  that  [gave]  purpose  to all  [their]  actions.”10 No wonder, then, that the 
French Revolution’s “stampede to the Rousseauist ethos,” to use Madelyn Gutwirth’s words, 
proved so disappointing to women.11 
Modern readers should be aware, however, that these now canonical appraisals of 
Rousseau are quite unsatisfactory, and they are so for several reasons. First of all, early feminist 
                                                          
Calif., 1989), 17; idem, The Sexual Contract (1988; rpt., Stanford, Calif., 2000). 
6 Léon Abensour, La femme et le féminisme avant la Révolution (Geneva, 1977), 373, 423. All translations from the 
French are my own. 
7Sarah Kofman, ‘‘Rousseau’s Phallocratic Ends,’’ trans. Mara Dukats, in Revaluing French Feminism, ed. Nancy 
Fraser and Sandra L. Bartky (Bloomington, Ind., 1992), 47. 
8 Joan Landes, Women and the Public Sphere in the Age of the French Revolution (Ithaca, N.Y., 1988), 89. 
9Carol Blum, Rousseau and the Republic of Virtue (Ithaca, N.Y., 1986), 209. 
10 Landes, Women and the Public, 226, 269. 
11Madelyn Gutwirth, The Twilight of the Goddesses: Women and Representation in the French Revo- lutionary Era 
(New Brunswick, N.J., 1992), 214. 
criticism of political theorists was marred by a remarkably old-fashioned methodology.12 
Strangely, Okin’s admittedly path breaking book seems much like another version of the “great 
thinker theory” except that the “great thinkers” are now shown to have been great 
(patriarchalist, functionalist) misogynists. These men are dealt with in abstraction, out of 
historical context, entirely divorced from the practical problems of political and social life of 
their times, and far removed from any real women. Their comments on women are repeatedly 
taken out of the discursive contexts within which they are made. They are then judged 
according to how well they measure up to our present egalitarian principles. The object of such 
an exercise more often seems to be to condemn the supposedly misogynist attitudes of men in 
general than to understand or explain the philosophy of the great thinkers. 
A related problem is that these early appraisals were often impaired by an approach that 
failed to distinguish between a thinker’s inﬂuence, or signiﬁcance, and his meaning. Informing 
Okin’s treatment of Rousseau, for example, is the belief that his ideas have contributed to the 
historical and on-going oppression of women. In this regard, Rousseau’s thought is worth 
examining because it is “representative of the whole Western tradition.”13 Figes justiﬁes a 
similar approach by declaring that Rousseau “was more the father of his times than the child 
of his times.”14 But looking at Rousseau through the lens of the eﬀect he may have had on a 
whole tradition does not get us any closer to his own intentions or to the historical meaning of 
his thought. 
Strangely, however, establishing the historical meaning of Rousseau’s pronouncements 
on women seems to be becoming less, rather than more, important in certain circles. Modern 
feminists are increasingly arguing that something of value can be retrieved from Rousseau’s 
thought by ignoring, overturning, or moving beyond what he meant to say.15 Some years ago, 
Margaret Canovan suggested that reading Rousseau was useful because his ideas “have 
implications extending far beyond his own intentions.”16 More recently, Linda Lange has 
                                                          
12 That is, it suﬀers from many of the problems explained by Quentin Skinner in his ‘‘Meaning and Understanding 
in the History of Ideas,’’ in Meaning and Context: Quentin Skinner and His Critics, ed. James Tully (Princeton, 
N.J., 1988). 
13 Okin, Women in Western Political Thought, 99. 
14 Figes, Patriarchal Attitudes, 94. 
15An important exception to this rule is Penny Weiss, Gendered Community: Rousseau, Sex, and Politics (New 
York, 1993), which is, in my opinion, the best recent feminist critique of Rousseau available. 
16 Margaret Canovan, ‘‘Rousseau’s Two Concepts of Citizenship,’’ in Women in Western Political 
Philosophy: Kant to Nietzche, ed. Ellen Kennedy and Susan Mendus (Brighton, U.K., 1987), 78. 
argued that Rousseau can be “surprisingly relevant to present problems” if we simply “turn 
[him] on his head”; reading Rousseau is a useful exercise in “knowing the enemy.”17 Nancy 
Holland agrees: despite what we already “know about Rousseau,” it is good to read 
“phallocratic texts” like his as an exercise in exposing the ideology that still oppresses women 
today.18 The problem is, of course, that with such an unhistorical or even antihistorical 
perspective we can retrieve meanings from Rousseau that are diametrically opposed to the ones 
he actually intended. For example, Lange ﬁnds that Rousseau’s works prove the family to be 
“an immoral institution... inimical to the development of a good society.”19 These 
interpretations are all similar in that not only is Rousseau’s “misogyny” accepted 
unquestioningly but his own intentions and the historical meaning of his work have, in some 
strange way, become moot. 
Another problem is that the frequently leveled charge of misogyny in reality oﬀers little 
satisfaction as an explanatory tool for understanding political theory. Many feminist critics of 
Rousseau ﬁnd themselves suggesting in a somewhat circular way that misogyny is both the 
cause and the eﬀect of Rousseau’s attitude toward women. Attempts to attribute Rousseau’s 
views to various psychosexual neuroses abound. It is customary to refer to his “fear of women” 
or, more particularly, to his fear of “unbridled female sexuality.”20 Some speak of his desire to 
take revenge on women (i.e., his “punitive nastiness”)21 as being triggered by unsuccessful love 
aﬀairs or by the slights he felt he had suffered at the hands of socially prominent women. Others 
attribute his views on women to latent homosexuality, urinary tract problems,22 a secret desire 
to be a woman, or anger at his mother for having died too soon.23 All these theories are similarly 
                                                          
17Lynda Lange, ‘‘Rousseau and Modern Feminism,’’ in Feminist Interpretations and Political Theory, ed. Mary 
Lyndon Shanley and Carole Pateman (University Park, Pa., 1991), 94, 109. 
18 Nancy Holland, introduction to Kofman, ‘‘Rousseau’s Phallocratic Ends,’’ in Revaluing French Feminism, 42, 43. 
19 Lange, ‘‘Rousseau,’’ 108. A similar problem of perspective allows Figes to claim that Rous- seau wanted to 
defend ‘‘the wealth and power that history and the capitalist system’’ have given to the male sex (Patriarchal 
Attitudes, 108), while Elizabeth Fox-Genovese (‘‘Introduction,’’ in French Women and the Age of Enlightenment, 
ed. Samia Spencer [Bloomington, Ind., 1984], 18) sees Rousseau as ‘‘the decisive prophet of male individualism in 
a competitive, capitalist society.’’ 
20 Interestingly, Joel Schwartz has turned this type of interpretation on its head, arguing that this so-called fear of 
female sexuality is actually proof of Rousseau’s respect for women’s separate but equal power. Schwartz, The 
Sexual Politics of Jean-Jacques Rousseau (Chicago, 1984). 
21 Gutwirth, Twilight, 125. 
22 Victor Wexler, “ ‘Made for Man’s Delight’: Rousseau as Antifeminist,’’ American Historical Review 81 (1976), 
esp. 271, 284. Wexler notes that the literature on Rousseau’s ‘‘paranoia’’ resulting from latent homosexuality is 
vast. 
23 Sarah Kofman, Le respect des femmes: Kant et Rousseau (Paris, 1982), 146–47, 125. 
unfruitful in that they assume rather than prove his misogyny and, moreover, can shed no light 
on the actual meaning of Rousseau’s political theories. Their usefulness is undermined further 
by the fact that misogyny is so often depicted as ubiquitous within the Western political 
tradition and that Rousseau is, in this regard, “representative” or “typical.” 
Finally, those who describe Rousseau as an arch-misogynist run into diﬃculty when 
they try to explain why women, and, indeed, so many highly intelligent and accomplished 
women, responded favorably to his writings. From a modern perspective, it is evidently 
embarrassing that women subscribed so “obediently” and “unquestioningly” to Rousseau’s 
ideas and were so “touchingly loyal” to him.24 We are encouraged to assume that these women 
must have been reacting emotionally, and not rationally, to his writings. With this argument, 
modern feminists come perilously close to describing women the way they do not wish them 
to be described: as irrational, emotional, and pathetically needy creatures who do not know 
what is best for them. It is suggested, for example, that rather than responding to Rousseau’s 
thought with their intellects, women were “seduced” by the picture Rousseau drew of them in 
his novels:25 he “ﬁred their hearts” rather than their brains.26 Because of the “profound sense 
of alienation” that some feminists regard as the “hallmark of the female condition in society,” 
women would have related to Rousseau on an emotional or psychological level because, like 
them, he was a “victim” and an “outcast.”27 It has even been postulated that women’s attraction 
to Rousseau was really “an unconscious temptation to surrender and even to destroy themselves 
- at the hands of men.”28 Underlying all these interpretations is the idea that if women liked 
Rousseau, they were profoundly mistaken and led astray by their emotions: “their 
Rousseauistic fervor” would not permit them to see the truth.29 Women are repeatedly viewed 
as victims, of widespread and unrelenting misogyny or of their own irrationality or both. 
                                                          
24 Gita May, ‘‘Rousseau’s ‘Antifeminism’ Reconsidered,’’ in Spencer, French Women, 311, 312.  
25 Fox-Genovese, ‘‘Introduction,’’ 19. 
26 May, ‘‘Rousseau’s ‘Antifeminism,’ “ 310. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Fox-Genovese, ‘‘Introduction,’’ 19. According to Madelyn Gutwirth (‘‘Madame de Staël, Rousseau, and the 
Woman Question,’’ PMLA 86 [1971]: 102, 103), Mme. de Staël’s ‘‘timid’’ reaction to Rousseau’s misogyny, so 
deeply disappointing and embarrassing, is due to her ‘‘emotive side’’; she is ‘‘obsessed with love.’’ Moreover, 
Mme. de Staël’s own works are proof of her ‘‘frenzied will to feminine self-sacriﬁce, to self-abandonment, even 
self-abasement.’’ An important correction to this view of Rousseau’s female readers is Mona Ozouf, Les mots des 
femmes: Essai sur la singularité française (Paris, 1999), 335–39. See also Mary Seidman Trouilles, Sexual Politics 
in the Enlightenment: Women Writers Read Rousseau (New York, 1997). 
29 May, ‘‘Rousseau’s ‘Antifeminism,’ ’’ 312. 
It is curious that this view of women subsists in some areas of feminist scholarship at 
the same time that great strides are being made in bringing to light the very active roles played 
and contributions made by women to various aspects of both the Enlightenment and the 
Revolution. In this regard, one could with beneﬁt adopt the approach of scholars such as Olwen 
Hufton and Suzanne Desan and extend it further. Eschewing facile characterizations of women 
as innocent victims and of men as misogynist victimizers, these scholars have focused on the 
experiences and actions of real women and have tried to explain not only why they behaved 
the way they did but how women’s own actions aﬀected the course of the Revolution. When 
considering the measures taken and pronouncements made by the male revolutionaries, Hufton 
is guided by a desire to “ﬁt the rhetoric issuing from the politicians on womanhood into 
context” and, in particular, to take into account how such pronouncements were prompted by 
real experiences with the actions of women.30 
I propose that we adopt a similar approach when we evaluate a philosopher like 
Rousseau. Indeed, recent trends in intellectual history have favored treating the great thinkers 
as ﬂesh-and-blood individuals directly engaged with the contemporary issues and practical 
politics of their own day. It is now recognized that before it is possible to understand what any 
given thinker might have meant by what he said, the intellectual historian must try to 
reconstitute the thinker’s historical context with particular sensitivity to the main problem or 
problems he might have been trying to solve. Careful consideration must be given to the range 
and multiplicity of discourses available to the thinker before his rhetorical strategies can be 
comprehended and evaluated. This methodology is also informed by the idea that no language 
is an island unto itself. Thus, the process of deciphering and disentangling the overlapping and 
intertwined discourses in a text, with the aim of arriving at the author’s purpose and intended 
meaning, precludes hasty judgments and easy generalizations. 
Those scholars who have tried to accord Rousseau a more sympathetic hearing, even 
from a feminist point of view, have paid surprisingly little attention to his historical context.31 
Among these, Jean Bethke Elshtain has been a welcome voice of moderation and restraint. 
Unsatisﬁed by “monotone, unidimensional representations of Rousseau” and doubting whether 
                                                          
30 Olwen Hufton, Women and the Limits of Citizenship in the French Revolution (Toronto, 1992), xxiii. 
31 This is true of Schwartz, Sexual Politics, despite the fact that the author criticizes others for neglecting the ‘‘larger 
social and political context’’ (2). See also Joseph Losco, ‘‘Rousseau on the Political Role of the Family,’’ History of 
Political Thought 9 (1988): 91–110, which nevertheless makes several astute observations. 
his intent could really have been “straight-forwardly misogynist,” Elshtain prefers to speak of 
his “ambivalence” toward women.32 It is precisely the ambivalence or even “contradictions” in 
Rousseau’s thought that have elicited sensitive and refreshingly sympathetic readings by Mira 
Morgenstern and Lori Jo Marso. Regretting that Rousseau is so often “seen through the lens of 
the critic rather than in terms of what he is trying to say,” Morgenstern promises to examine 
Rousseau’s thought “on its own terms.” Strangely, however, her examination does not involve 
reconstructing Rousseau’s historical context. Noting somewhat contradictorily that “great 
books resonate with a depth beyond their authors’ intentions,” Morgenstern suggests that we 
read Rousseau as “speaking directly to twentieth-century concerns.” Paying careful attention 
to Rousseau’s literary works, she rightly notes the “near-reverential terms” with which 
Rousseau describes women as “the moral centers of the family” and highlights the 
“empowerment of women” that this entails. However, because the female characters in 
Rousseau’s literary works meet with tragic ends, Morgenstern concludes that Rousseau must 
have been “torn” with regard to women. Thus, she bids modern readers to ponder why 
Rousseau’s own “consciously proﬀered solutions to the social and political issues . . . 
eﬀectively fail.”33 
Similarly, Marso highlights Rousseau’s obvious “sympathy” toward his female 
characters and believes that the most instructive aspect of Rousseau’s thought with regard to 
women is the way in which it “fails.” “The success of Rousseau’s male citizens,” she argues, 
“is had only in light of the demise of his women”; Rousseau’s “carefully constructed gender 
boundaries fail to buttress, and ultimately serve to undermine his social contract.”34 Once again, 
then, it is not Rousseau’s intended meaning that interests these recent scholars, because that 
would be like saying that Rousseau wrote stories (La nouvelle Héloïse and Emile) in order to 
disprove his own theories (The Social Contract), an awkward proposition at best. It is instead 
what modern readers can learn from the purported “failures” and “contradictions” in his work 
that interests Marso and Morgenstern. And Marso readily admits to bringing a number of 
                                                          
32 Jean Bethke Elshtain, Meditations on Modern Political Thought: Masculine/Feminine Themes 
from Luther to Arendt (University Park, Pa., 1991), x; idem, Public Man, Private Woman: Women in Social and 
Political Thought (Princeton, N.J., 1981), 157. 
33 Mira Morgenstern, Rousseau and the Politics of Ambiguity: Self, Culture, and Society (University 
Park, Pa., 1996), vii, ix, 214, 228, 190, 240 (my italics). 
34 Lori Jo Marso, (Un)Manly Citizens: Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s and Germaine de Staël’s Subversive Women 
(Baltimore, Md., 1999), 2, 5–6. 
insights to Rousseau’s works that were “not on [his] mind” when he wrote them.35 Uncovering 
the hidden suppositions of Rousseau’s works, rather than his express intentions, is also the goal 
of Elizabeth Wingrove’s Republican Romance.36 
That the time is ripe for a serious reevaluation of Rousseau’s intended meaning is 
evidenced by several recent works that are paving the way for a more self-consciously historical 
approach to his views on women. Lieselotte Steinbrügge shows how coherent, understandable, 
and interesting Rousseau’s notions of female nature can become when seen in the context of 
the debates on womanhood taking place during the French Enlightenment. Moreover, she 
convincingly argues that far from contradicting his political thought, Rousseau’s notions of 
femininity “derive their logic from the total context of his theory.”37 Anne Vila further 
elucidates Rousseau’s views on women as expressed in La nouvelle Héloïse by situating them 
within the contemporary discourse on “the moral hygiene of sensibility.”38 Finally, Nicole 
Fermon has suggested that many so-called contradictions in Rousseau’s thought disappear 
when he is seen within his own historical context. Highlighting what also she regards as the 
essential continuity of Rousseau’s thought, Fermon explores the ways in which Rousseau 
identiﬁed women as “powerful agents for political revitalization.”39 
This article contributes to the recent reevaluation of Rousseau’s attitudes toward 
women by reconstructing the historical context of Rousseau’s Letter to d’Alembert, in which 
some of his most outrageously “misogynist” statements are made. Many feminists unaware of 
the Genevan context have reacted particularly strongly to this text. Gutwirth, for example, 
believes that Rousseau wrote the essay out of a real “vendetta against women.”40 According to 
Landes, he wrote it in a “near frenzy of misogynistic hyperbole.41 Linda Zerilli believes that it 
betrays Rousseau’s “fear of becoming woman” and his dream of a society “without a female 
voice.”42 When the Letter is seen within its Genevan context, however, it conveys an altogether 
                                                          
35 Ibid., viii. 
36 Elizabeth Wingrove, in her Rousseau’s Republican Romance (Princeton, N.J., 2000), argues that Rousseau’s 
republicanism is inseparable from his ‘‘gender ideology’’; it entails ‘‘compulsive heterosexuality.’’ 
37 Lieselotte Steinbrügge, The Moral Sex: Woman’s Nature in the French Enlightenment, trans. 
Pamela E. Selwyn (New York, 1995), 56. 
38 Anne Vila, Enlightenment and Pathology: Sensibility in the Literature and Medicine of Eighteenth- Century 
France (Baltimore, Md., 1998), esp. chap. 6. 
39 Nicole Fermon, Domesticating Passions (Hanover, N.H., 1997), 50. 
40 Gutwirth, Twilight, 124. 
41 Landes, Women and the Public, 88. 
42 Linda Zerilli, Signifying Woman: Culture and Chaos in Rousseau, Burke, and Mill (Ithaca, N.Y., 1994), 34. 
diﬀerent meaning. 
A fact of primary relevance to any understanding of Rousseau is that he was a Genevan, 
not a French, thinker. Born and raised in that independent, republican, and Calvinist city-state, 
Rousseau remained, throughout his life, closely attached to its values and concerned by its 
political travails. It is a culture that informed all of his writings, but none more than the Letter 
to d’Alembert, which, among all of his political work, and along with the rarely read Letters 
Written from the Mountain, most ressembles an oeuvre de circonstance. 
The highly charged political atmosphere of eighteenth-century Geneva has been 
described elsewhere, but a few points bear repeating and are elaborated upon here.43 
Throughout much of the eighteenth century, a contest took place in Geneva between an 
increasingly disgruntled and politicized bourgeoisie wishing to regain the political rights it had 
lost during the previous century and an increasingly wealthy patrician government refusing to 
relinquish its hold on power.44 In this contest, the patriciate resorted to social contract theory 
in order to legitimize its absolutizing regime. It also used the language of doux commerce 45 in 
an eﬀort to depoliticize people, vindicate its own wealth and style of life, and justify its 
stranglehold on power. 
The argument went something like this: Geneva’s form of government had long ago 
been established by a social contract that conferred political authority on a small council of 
twenty-ﬁve men and that was now irrevocable. This system was good for everyone since 
government should be in the hands of experts who know what is best and have the requisite 
leisure time to rule, while the rest of the population should tend to their real interests - in other 
words, their private lives and businesses. Under the protection of such a benevolent 
government, a depoliticized citizenry should enjoy all the advantages of doux commerce. 
For our present purposes, it is important to realize a much neglected fact: connected to 
patrician social contract and doux commerce theory was also an ethos of sociability that 
accorded a vital role to women. To understand how this worked one has to keep in mind that 
                                                          
43 Helena Rosenblatt, Rousseau and Geneva: From the First Discourse to the Social Contract, 1749-1762 (New 
York, 1997). 
44 The term bourgeois in eighteenth-century Geneva designated a citizen with voting rights in the General Council. 
45 The term doux commerce invokes the notion, increasingly widespread during the eighteenth century, that through 
economic trade and social interaction men are enriched in both a material and moral sense. The classic text on this is 
Albert Hirschman, The Passions and the Interests: Political Arguments for Capitalism before Its Triumph 
(Princeton, N.J., 1997). 
patrician versions of social contract theory actually predicated themselves on a very negative 
appraisal of human (male) nature.46 A contract of submission to a governmental authority was 
repeatedly justiﬁed on the grounds that men were highly self-interested and unsociable 
creatures, passion-driven and prone to violence.47 Men were likened to “tigers in the woods” 
or “ferocious beasts” who, if unchecked, would threaten society with anarchy and dissolution.48 
The social contract that established the government and to which all men submitted made no 
claims to altering their passionate, violent natures. 
This is where women come in.49 The great natural law thinker Samuel Pufendorf had said 
that marriage was the “nursery of the human race.” His followers elaborated upon this idea, 
accentuating not only marriage’s procreative purpose but its role in the moral improvement of 
mankind.50 Thus, the Genevan natural law thinker and patrician spokesman Jean-Jacques 
Burlamaqui (1694–1748) claims that marriage is not only “like the nursery of humankind,” it also 
inclines man marvelously toward sociability.”51 Elaborating on this idea, Burlamaqui notes that 
“the most diﬃcult and unsociable natures become moderate, human, and manageable” through the 
inﬂuence of women.52 He provides a very telling example from Roman history: the story of 
Coriolanus, a “proud Republican,” disinterested, wise, and respectful of the laws, yet “hard & 
impetuous” and too inclined to become politicized. Once when he was angered over an issue 
concerning tribunes, no one could assuage his wrath, not even the priests, and so it was decided to 
                                                          
46 I do accept the part of Pateman’s and others’ argument that holds that the ‘‘men’’ discussed in social contract 
theories were indeed men, and not women. 
47 Men are ‘‘sociable’’ in patrician social contract theories only because they need others to survive, not because 
they are naturally inclined to harmonious behavior. 
48 Rosenblatt, Rousseau, 139, 155, 126–27, 133–34. 
49 This is also where religion comes in. See ibid., esp. 135–40, 150, 155–57. 
50 For Gershom Carmichael’s and Frances Hutcheson’s contributions in this regard, see Jane Rendall, ‘‘Virtue and 
Commerce: Women in the Making of Adam Smith’s Political Economy,’’ in Kennedy and Mendus, Women in 
Western Political Philosophy. 
51 Lettre de M. Burlamaqui sur le mariage, ecrite à Mylord Kilmorey published as a supplement to the Principes du 
droit naturel et politique (Geneva, 1764), 3:290. Some of Burlamaqui’s most interesting arguments explicitly link 
man’s sex drive and sexual pleasure to sociability. It is the sexual pleasure principle that draws man to woman and 
here the socializing begins. Much of this fascinating text reads not just as an apology but as a veritable celebration of 
sex, somewhat surprising given the prevailing image of Calvinist Genevans. Moreover it shows that Rousseau did 
not invent ‘‘sexual politics’’ (on this see Schwartz, Sexual Politics); he only redirected it. Burlamaqui suggests that 
without sexual pleasure, men would not likely produce children, would not be able to live harmoniously with their 
wives, and would not be prone to raising their children once they had them. Sex is the ‘‘physical principle of 
sociability.’’ Men are socialized by their wives through the nuptial bed. Clearly, it would be misleading to say that 
this social contract theorist thought women and, in particular, ‘‘women’s bodies’’ to be subversive of political order; 
moreover, these ideas call into question the overly neat separation between ‘‘public’’ and ‘‘private’’ spheres. For an 
example of the view I am here contesting, see Pateman, Disorder, esp. 4, 6, 17, 21. 
52 Lettre de M. Burlamaqui, 291. 
send in the women. Upon seeing his mother, wife, and “a host of other Roman ladies,” the proud 
republican immediately broke down and gave up his ﬁght. He was unable to resist the “powerful 
and enchanting qualities,” the “solicitations and tears of the women,” the “natural inclinations that 
have such force on the heart of man.”53 It is noteworthy that this view of women’s pacifying role 
was reinforced by contemporary Calvinist moral theology: according to Bénédict Pictet (1655–
1724), one of the important duties of wives was to labor “to subdue the bad humor of their 
husbands.”54 
One can readily understand why this role of women was so highly prized and promoted 
by patrician spokesmen in Geneva, since rendering men sociable and manageable meant 
making them docile toward their government as well. Indeed, the Genevan patriciate both 
celebrated and promoted this pacifying role for women. At moments of political tension, 
ministers favorable to the government used church sermons to remind mothers, “No one can 
sooner than you inspire submission in children, and the respect due to the [established] laws.”55 
Through the “gentle bonds” of marriage, the family, and private “commerce,” women could 
accomplish this important task. 
Of course “women” in eighteenth-century Geneva did not constitute a uniﬁed, 
homogeneous group. During the previous century, while Geneva’s form of government grew 
more oligarchical, sociopolitical developments created a situation in which the experience and 
outlook of patrician women diﬀered greatly from that of less-privileged women. Patrician 
ladies were the wives and daughters of the fortunate few, those Genevans lucky and clever 
enough to have successfully switched from artisanal manufacture to banking, thereby enriching 
themselves and their families in unprecedented ways. As they prospered through banking and 
commerce, these men progressively segregated themselves and their families in the upper town 
of Geneva, where they could install themselves in the vast and luxuriously decorated 
apartments suitable to a rich governing class. Exempting themselves from, or simply breaking, 
Geneva’s sumptuary ordinances against luxury, they hired servants, sometimes as many as 
eight or nine, ate with expensive silverware on elegant porcelain, dressed in the latest ﬁnery, 
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drove around in their liveried coaches, and acquired sophisticated art collections. They fell 
more and more under the cultural and intellectual inﬂuence of France. Their daughters were 
often given extensive private instruction, including music and dancing lessons. And when these 
patrician girls reached adolescence, there were several exclusive little clubs, called “sociétés 
des demoiselles,” to which they could be sent, where they mixed together for card games and 
conversation in preparation for their debut into society.56 
Wealthy Genevans and their wives made frequent trips to Paris, where they could learn 
the manners of polite society, cultivate their taste for the arts, and, in particular, go to the 
theater, an art form speciﬁcally disallowed in Geneva. As the biographer of one patrician young 
woman points out, wealthy Genevan newlyweds considered a trip to Paris the ideal 
honeymoon: “One took the opportunity to initiate oneself into real society, to learn how to 
make conversation and entertain.”57 Upon their return, the lifestyle of the Genevan rich closely 
resembled that of the noble and upper bourgeois elite of French cities such as Lyon and Paris.58 
Mme. d’Epinay, on a visit to Geneva, described a very pleasant social life. At gatherings where 
men and women mixed together, tea, café au lait, chocolate, and “excellent pastries” were 
served and various activities took place: “One plays a lot of games, one works, one sometimes 
makes music.” In particular, Mme. D’Epinay noted that the highly educated patrician women 
had a surprisingly strong predilection for card games.59 For all these reasons, then, a young 
lady of the Genevan patriciate probably had more in common with a French demoiselle than 
she had with girls of the lower classes in her hometown. Indeed, experts note that in eighteenth-
century Geneva, “wealthy young ladies did not mix with the people.”60 
Ami Lullin must have had these young patrician ladies in mind when he wrote his 
essays on “the woman of merit.” Lullin (1695–1756) was certainly well attuned to the outlook 
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and values of the Genevan patriciate.61 Heir to the largest banking fortune in Geneva, he was 
consecrated minister in 1718. He became a pastor in 1730 and then rose through the ranks to 
become a professor of ecclesiastical history in 1737 and rector of Geneva’s academy in 1753. 
Well-connected with Geneva’s governing councils, he was also a close friend of Jean-Jacques 
Burlamaqui. Lullin’s essays deserve our attention because they express the patrician ideal of 
womanhood in the early part of the eighteenth century in Geneva.62 
Taking issue with the pessimistic views of Saint-Evremond, Lullin enumerates a long 
list of feminine virtues, “rare” and “diﬃcult” but “possible” for a woman to obtain. Top on the 
list is her attention to the management of her household, the “good order” she keeps in her 
home, the care with which she tends to her family and to the “domestic economy.” Naturally, 
she must “second” her husband and “please” him in every way possible. She must also practice 
“a solid piety,” go to church regularly and display pure morals, and, in particular, be chaste and 
faithful. 
But equally important to Lullin is the attention this woman pays to “the duties of civil 
life.” “In particular,” he writes, an essential part of a woman’s real merit lies “in the way she 
contributes to the amenities of her husband and society [my italics]. A man with taste, buoyed 
by a pleasant fortune, whose domestic servants are numerous and whose house is well 
appointed … must desire to turn his home into a refuge of good company and pleasure for his 
worthy friends.” In fact, one of the good oﬃces of “opulence,” Lullin explains, is that it enables 
one to “form a kind of court [my italics].” And here the role of a good wife is crucial. Lullin’s 
“woman of merit” knows that “the ﬁrst obligation we have to Reason is to make ourselves 
sociable.” Thus, she must cultivate and exercise some very special qualities in order to perform 
her socializing task. She must be obliging, welcoming, and eager to please. She must be able 
to anticipate her guests’ desires and direct their conversation so that “each person is pleased 
and ﬁnds his amour propre satisﬁed.” To accomplish this she must not only “entertain” her 
guests but know “how to enter into the minds of others” so as to help them “develop their ideas” 
and even “give birth to them.” She must do all this modestly, ‘‘without their realizing it,’’ 
hiding any trace of superiority with charm and aﬀability. 
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To Lullin, it goes without saying that a woman who can do all this is also “an 
enlightened woman,” since everyone knows that “Enlightenment [les Lumières] is inseparable 
from real merit. An ignorant woman has only a stupid merit. … She is virtuous less by principle 
than by a sort of instinct.” Having thus provided an ambitious list of qualities and talents and 
what seems to be quite a demanding social role for the patrician woman, Lullin adds, “Such is 
her sphere; she does not leave this circle.” Interestingly, Lullin interjects, with no further 
comment, that “little boys have their duties, for which a mother is rarely useful.” It is striking 
to consider how very closely Lullin’s description of woman’s socializing role resembles the 
ideology subscribed to by the French salonnières.63 Indeed, Lullin sent his own daughter to 
Paris on her honeymoon and arranged for her to meet and thereafter be invited several times 
by Mme. Geoﬀrin.64 He organized a similar trip for his granddaughter, who was invited not 
only by Mme. Geoﬀrin but by Mme. Necker as well.65 But it is important to realize that Geneva 
was a very diﬀerent place from Paris and that therefore the political connotations attached to 
salon sociability were also of a diﬀerent sort. 
Recent historiography has painted a rather rosy picture of salon sociability, which makes a 
good deal of sense given the nature of Ancien Régime France. According to Carolyn Lougee, 
seventeenth-century French salons functioned like a “melting-pot which blurred distinctions of 
birth and profession,” thereby helping to expand the social elite.66 Dena Goodman highlights the 
“distinctively republican form of government” exercised by salonnières.67 And Daniel Gordon 
suggests that salons might be seen as part of a rise of “egalitarian sociability” based on a highly 
optimistic view of the “progressive power of conversation.”68 Viewed from the perspective of a 
politicized member of the artisanal Genevan bourgeoisie, however, salon sociability connoted 
something very diﬀerent. It was immediately tainted by its association with a patrician elite seeking 
to monopolize power and subvert republican and democratic values. It was, after all, an ideal 
attendant to “opulence,” as Lullin himself explained. It was also a particularly French type of ethos. 
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French authors often celebrated sociability as a distinctly French contribution to civilization. 
Judging by the many trips to Paris discussed above it would seem that the Genevan patriciate 
agreed. French culture was seen as the best in the world because it was the most sociable and the 
most polite; it had reached the highest point civilization had yet attained.69 And women were seen 
as particularly adept agents and purveyors of this French style of culture. To a disgruntled Genevan 
citizen of the middle or lower orders, however, the fact that Genevan men were acquiring the 
manners of the French aristocracy through the agency of women and salon sociability was no cause 
for celebration. 
In Geneva, theater attendance became the very symbol of patrician corruption, moral 
and political, as the wealthy and Frenchiﬁed men and women of the upper town circumvented, 
or simply broke, the city’s ordinances and attended - and sometimes performed in - theatrical 
performances staged at Voltaire’s home on the outskirts of Geneva.70 Here again, however, 
patrician women seemed particularly implicated. Voltaire’s own views on the 
interconnectedness of French culture, sociability, and women are well known. In the 
introduction to his tragedy Zaïre, performed to the delight of a Genevan audience in the spring 
of 1755,71 Voltaire claimed that “of all the nations France is the one which has most 
experienced society,” adding that “the continual commerce between the two sexes, so lively 
and so polite, has introduced a politeness quite unknown elsewhere. Society depends on 
women.”72 While d’Alembert believed Geneva would beneﬁt from having a theater, Voltaire 
undoubtedly thought that Genevan women could play an important civilizing role as a 
complement to the advent of theater. One can well imagine the joy with which patrician women 
embraced their new vocation. 
In other words, in Geneva, one’s socioeconomic position and political opinions would 
have determined how one viewed salon sociability and the role of women in promoting it. 
Whereas in France salons might be seen as having served a democratizing role in that they 
helped the upwardly mobile bourgeoisie learn the aristocratic manners they needed to be 
admitted into the elite, in Geneva, they could be seen as places where people who already were 
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members of the elite forgot their republican duties and values. A disgruntled Genevan citizen 
of a lower order would not have been impressed by what he would have seen as Genevans 
mimicking the manners of French high society. And if women’s role in history was to promote 
this kind of behavior, it was not to their credit. Moreover, the disgruntled citizen would have 
been aware that the very women attending theater performances at Voltaire’s home, and 
practicing this form of sociability in their uppertown apartments, also subscribed to some very 
undemocratic political views that they were not shy about expressing. 
Because of both a paucity of sources and a seeming lack of scholarly interest, very little 
is known about the political views and actions of Genevan women in the eighteenth century. 
There is, however, the famous case of Elizabeth Beaulacre, a patrician woman of extraordinary 
entrepreneurial ability who single-handedly built and managed such a highly proﬁtable 
business that her son inherited one of the largest for- tunes in Geneva. A century later Geneva’s 
watchmakers union was still grumbling over her practice of buying elections by forcing those 
who worked for her to vote her way.73 
Careful reading of archival sources reveals that other patrician women not only 
supported their husbands’ causes but sometimes acted in blatantly abusive and arrogant ways 
toward the bourgeoisie. One such text is a journal entry describing a particularly tense moment 
in Geneva when a group of citizens were about to deliver a petition to their magistrates 
demanding a return of their lost political rights. As they walked in solemn procession through 
the upper town, patrician women apparently looked down at them from their windows and 
ridiculed them and then encouraged their husbands to be disdainful and uncompromising: 
The wives of these men made insolent and rude speeches against the Citizens and Bourgeois … 
the women were the ﬁrst to animate their husbands saying that it was an embarrassment to allow them- 
selves to be led around by a band of good-for-nothings. When they [the women] saw some of them [the 
citizens] passing under their windows with their swords at their sides they would say there go the 
sovereigns, - and when they were together playing cards and one of them lost she would play the fool 
and say mockingly that she wanted to consult the General Council to see if it would pay her back—Is 
this the way one should behave . . . in small state like ours in which all conditions are, so to speak, 
equal?74 
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 Another source, by the bourgeois leader François d’Ivernois (1757– 1842), describes 
the behavior and attitudes of patrician women similarly. D’Ivernois recalls with obvious 
frustration that Genevan women who traveled to Paris with their banker husbands were 
frequently disposed to acquiring a “French tone” there. In France they learned to prefer theater 
and poetry to ‘‘serious discussions’’ and to prefer “French gallantry” to “our sumptuary laws.” 
They also came back enthusiastic supporters of “the mingling of the two sexes.” Indeed, upon 
their return to Geneva these patrician women apparently propagated “a perpetual stream of 
mockery and sarcasm against the austere manners of Republicans.” What is worse, they 
returned believing that a democratic form of government was hopelessly old-fashioned and that 
Geneva would be better served by a more aristocratic regime. D’Ivernois scornfully ascribes 
the following words to patrician women: “Amongst a commercial people, a Democracy, even 
limited, is a chimera. Diﬀerent manners [moeurs], diﬀerent laws; we are no longer poor like 
the Spartans such that we can submit to their austere institutions... let us force our compatriots 
to give up these periodic convulsions [assemblies of the General Council]. Let us make them 
adopt the practices of the likeable and gay people [the French] that surround us.”75 
Salon sociability was of course not a “merit” accessible to Genevan women of the lower 
orders. Sixty-ﬁve percent of Genevan women could not even sign their own name in 1700.76 
Calvinist reformers had made ambitious promises about free public schooling in 1536, but no 
one seems to have been very interested in providing education for poor girls. In 1730, however, 
they were invited to attend the free and confessional private schools created by the newly 
established Société des Catechumènes. In these schools, girls and boys learned basic reading 
skills and memorized the catechism, thought to be good training for their future lives. 
Presumably, however, such people would only be able to aspire to the “stupid” kind of virtue 
referred to by Ami Lullin. 
Most Genevan women who worked outside their own homes were domestic servants; 
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a 1788 census indicates that domestiques formed 55 percent of the female labor force.77 
Hampered and restricted by various ordinances against women’s work passed during the 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, and by the increasing division of labor within industries, 
women who engaged in manufacturing in the eighteenth century were always relegated to the 
most undesirable, unhealthy, and low-paying jobs - never earning more than half the salary of 
men.78 Women’s particular vulnerability is testiﬁed to by the fact that poor- house hospital 
lodgers were most frequently single women, including widows and abandoned wives with 
children.79 
Toward the end of the seventeenth century, new employment opportunities opened up 
for women in the cloth-printing industry, just beginning to take oﬀ in Geneva. Economic 
historians note that this was the ﬁrst sector of the economy to see factories in the modern sense 
of the term. With no guild regulations to restrict it, the cloth-printing industry proﬁted from 
employing large numbers of women and children. But the poor conditions, low pay, and 
irregular work has caused recent experts to liken the people who engaged in such work to a 
“proletariat.”80 Demographic specialists ascribe the decrease in female life-expectancy rates 
during the eighteenth century in Geneva to the generally deplorable working conditions for 
women in an otherwise expanding economy.81 As mothers’ health deteriorated, it is not 
surprising that infant mortality rates also went up.82 In contrast, patrician little girls were so 
healthy and well taken care of that their fathers devised the famous “Genevan formula” for 
making money: a lucrative life annuity scheme based on the presumed longevity of their 
daughters’ lives.83 
A third group of Genevan women probably counted themselves lucky to be able to work 
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within their own homes. They were the wives and daughters of Genevan artisans who owned and 
operated their own workshops, usually within the watchmaking industry. For these people the 
home often was the workshop; in the words of experts, “the frontiers between the private and the 
public sphere were blurred.”84 Traditionally, artisan wives would tend to the daily provisioning of 
the household, supervise the servants, and partake in the often complicated and time-consuming 
tasks of food preparation, housecleaning, and laundry, while they ministered to the needs of the 
children, the sick, and the old. But whenever they had time and were needed they would also work 
alongside their husbands. 
Eighteenth-century Geneva experienced a “golden age” of economic prosperity during 
which certain groups of people became very wealthy.85 While the patriciate prospered through 
their banking and money-lending businesses, a sizable group of artisans also gained wealth as 
the watchmaking and related industries experienced a spectacular boom. Not surprisingly, these 
artisans’ lifestyles changed considerably. They acquired more leisure time and a taste for many 
of the same luxuries appreciated by the patriciate. They worked shorter hours. They got wise 
to the life annuity schemes by which one could make easy money by investing in the French 
public debt. So the very rich were not the only ones who gambled with their money this way; 
it is also because of the investment patterns of prospering artisans that by the mid–eighteenth 
century, Geneva was rapidly acquiring the reputation of being a city of rentiers living oﬀ their 
capital placements. 
The dangers of this overexposure to the French public debt and related disinvestment 
in local industry have been discussed elsewhere.86 The point to retain here is that the wives of 
the prospering watchmakers and other artisans seem to have begun adopting the manners of 
the patriciate, particularly in matters relating to their appearance and luxury consumption. 
Women, including those of the bourgeois artisanal order, were the most frequent oﬀenders of 
the sumptuary ordinances. Apparently, they often needed to be reminded by their social 
superiors about the unseemliness of “pretending to belong to a higher rank.”87 
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After all, one of the important qualities of a “woman of merit,” according to Ami Lullin, 
was her awareness that “decorum and her own interests demand that she styles her hair and 
dresses herself according to her age and rank” (my italics). Moreover, women of the bourgeois 
order acquired the habit of using wet nurses for their babies, contributing to an unusually high 
infant mortality rate for their socioeconomic group. In fact modern experts have noted that 
Genevan babies of the middle order died at a higher rate than poorer babies whose own mothers 
nursed them.88 
Rousseau’s Letter to d’Alembert has a clear political message: it warns Genevans that 
because of their comportment the city’s constitution is in serious danger. Through a critique of 
the theater, Rousseau delivers a devastating attack on the patriciate and its Frenchiﬁed values. 
Geneva is not France, he says, and Geneva’s particular constitution needs re- publican values 
to sustain it. Purposefully he disassociates virtue from learning and reﬁnement in order to 
reassociate it with patriotism and the republican values he thought necessary to sustain a 
democratic constitution. Pointedly he criticizes an ethos that could only concern the very rich 
and in fact mainly gloriﬁed them and legitimized their absolutizing rule. 
With a fuller understanding of the Genevan context we can now understand why 
Rousseau also criticized patrician women and the patrician ideal of womanhood. We can see 
that the Letter to d’Alembert was not about refusing women a political role; and it was certainly 
not about banishing women to a “narrow”, “restricted” domestic sphere where they could 
“entertain” their men; in fact, it should be read as conveying the very opposite message. With 
the Letter to d’Alembert, Rousseau sought to reorient Genevan women’s priorities away from 
frivolous, dangerous habits and toward the right kinds of political and economic values needed 
to sustain a democratic republic. 
Thus, the Letter to d’Alembert was really a follow-up to what Rousseau had already 
said to the women of Geneva in his “Dedication” to the Second Discourse. There he uses 
ostensible ﬂattery to deliver a biting critique of the ruling regime, including its women. 
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Betraying not just a hint of sarcasm, Rousseau compliments Genevan women for the beneﬁcent 
role they are playing in the city. He praises them for their “simple and modest attire,” their 
disdain for luxury, and the admirable way in which they inspire “love of the laws within the 
state and concord among the citizens.” His writing rises to the level of farce when he actually 
thanks women for correcting the bad habits that “our young people adopt in other countries... 
among debauched women.” In conclusion, he asks Genevan women always to be just what 
they are: “chaste guardians of our morals and the gentle bonds of our peace.”89 No wonder that 
upon reading the “Dedication” the Genevan magistrate Jean-Louis Du Pan remarked, “You 
represent us as we should be and not as we are.”90 His comment undoubtedly referred to 
Genevan women as well as men. Rousseau’s similar message in the Letter to d’Alembert would 
not have been lost on his Genevan audience. Here, too, he lectures the patriciate and warns the 
citizens not to adopt its Frenchiﬁed ways and values. And with regard to Geneva’s women, 
Rousseau’s critique was indeed biting. But it would have been clear to everyone in Geneva that 
Rousseau’s denunciation of the “shameless” women “with no honor,” who ﬂock to the theater 
and prance around all “decked out” in their luxurious ﬁnery referred to the women of the upper 
town and their misguided imitators. As for the patrician ideal of womanhood, Rousseau 
ingeniously adopted it only to turn it against the patriciate: if indeed women make men 
“gentle,” “soft,” and docile, then they threaten the constitution and should be reprimanded for 
doing so. He ridicules the “chatter of women’s societies” and blames women for emasculating 
men, in fact for turning men into women.91 By calling into question their masculinity, Rousseau 
is goading patrician men to give up their Frenchiﬁed ways as well. He criticizes the whole 
notion of salon sociability, seeing it for what in many ways it was, a devalorization, or even a 
repudiation, of the political domain.92 Rousseau could not abide an ethos that turned would-be 
citizens into verse-writing “wits” and thereby caused them to forget their “real duties.”93 He 
lashes out against women’s much vaunted role in distracting men from their duties: men should 
be “spared from having to lower their ideas to the level of women” so that they might “devote 
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themselves to solemn and serious speech without fear of ridicule.”94 These were clearly the 
words of a man who had been oﬀended by patrician women’s mockery of republican values 
and who was deeply disturbed by the inﬂuence they were having on their husbands and other 
women. In fact, with his Letter to d’Alembert, Rousseau delivered a deliberate slap across the 
face of the women of the upper town. Upon reading it, the Genevan Antoine-Jacques Roustan 
immediately identiﬁed Rousseau’s targets: “our little women of the upper quarters, our 
Demoiselles of taste.”95 A patrician woman remarked, “Nothing is more mad and made for the 
rabble.”96 
Rousseau’s warning also contains an important economic dimension with particular 
relevance to women. He warns Genevans about the nefarious eﬀects that the division of labor 
is having within their manufacturing industries, as well as “the slackening of work,” the 
“increase in spending,” and the “decrease in sales” taking place in the city as it is prospering.97 
He wants Genevans to consider the dangerous political consequences of the growing 
“inequality of fortunes.”98 Rousseau advocates “austere parsimony” and reminds his 
compatriots that “the aﬄuence of the great majority comes from diligent work, economy, and 
moderation.”99 As important consumers and as managers of their “domestic economies,”100 
women were the principal targets of Rousseau’s warnings about Genevan spending habits and 
his denunciation of luxury.101 Rousseau reminds all Genevans, including women, of the 
“connection between luxury and misery;” he exhorts them not to become lazy and lose their 
taste for useful work: “We all have only our industry. The Genevan people sustains itself only 
by virtue of work.”102 
In contrast to the salon-governing, luxury-consuming patrician hostess so celebrated by 
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Ami Lullin’s ideal of womanhood, Rousseau honors the ordinary woman who tends to her 
home and family and thereby does her part in sustaining both the economy and the constitution. 
His message is that women do not acquire virtue through learning, fancy clothes and hairdos, 
stylized speech, or salon sociability. Only by shunning French values and by embracing 
republican ones does a woman earn respect and “merit.” Rousseau revalorizes the ideal of the 
artisanal wife who works within her family home, which is the very cradle of republican values: 
“This is when she shows herself in all the dignity of an honest woman; this is when she 
commands respect and beauty shares with honor the homage paid to virtue.”103 
In several ways, then, one can see that Rousseau both speaks to women and defends 
them in the Letter to d’Alembert. First, he deﬁnes virtue so as to make it accessible to all 
women, not just an elite. Second, he shows obvious admiration for the simple, frugal, 
hardworking woman. Finally, he questions whether the patrician ethos does even its own 
women justice: “It would not be diﬃcult to show that instead of gaining anything by these 
customs, women lose by them. They are ﬂattered without being loved; they are served without 
being honored.”104 Often these theater-going patrician women are treated like merchandise; 
Rousseau remonstrates against “the exhibition of ladies all dressed up as best they can and 
placed on display in boxes [loges] as if in front of a boutique, waiting for buyers.”105 
Like many, if not most, people of his times, Rousseau believed in the power of women 
to inﬂuence men. This is why he says, “Do you want to know men? Study women.”106 This is 
also why he says, “All perish through the disorder of women.”107 Women are crucial to the 
moral health of the republic. The problem in Geneva was that the wrong kinds of women, 
mainly patrician women, were exercising the wrong kinds of inﬂuence. And, increasingly, the 
wives of ordinary citizens were copying them. Rousseau’s message to these women was: Get 
political. Stop subverting republican values; stop mimicking the manners of French aristocracy; 
and stop your pernicious luxury consumption. Start remembering that you are citizens of a 
republic and play your part in reviving both the constitution and the economy. 
Another way Rousseau tried to reorient women’s values toward republicanism was by 
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extolling the women of ancient Sparta and speaking of the great respect they commanded. 
Spartan women loved the laws and knew how important it was for the laws to be loved; they 
were not soft; they educated their sons to be patriotic citizens. Rousseau knew how important 
it was to “direct public opinion” in ways favorable to the republic.108 This was the vital role he 
wanted Genevan women to play. 
They had to use their power to politicize, not depoliticize, their sons and husbands. 
Later, in Emile, Rousseau spelled out the reasons “every virtuous nation has shown 
respect to women.” These reasons have nothing to do with a woman’s “softening” inﬂuence; 
in fact, the reasons the ancients admired women are diametrically opposed to those of the 
Genevan patriciate: “Every revolution began with the women. Through a woman Rome gained 
her liberty, through a woman the plebeians obtained the consulate, through a woman the 
tyranny of the decemvirs was ended; it was the women who saved Rome [when besieged by 
Coriolanus].”109 A ﬁnal point should perhaps be made. A basic consensus existed in Geneva 
that a woman’s terrestrial destiny was to marry and bear children and that, in large part because 
of this obligation, her status was unavoidably dependent on a man’s. Nobody was advocating 
the enfranchisement of women during this time; indeed, most of Geneva’s women would have 
regarded such a proposal as pie in the sky. The patriciate, whose ﬂattering ideas of womanhood 
are brought to light here, were trying to limit, not extend, the electorate. In the eighteenth 
century, out of a population of about twenty-ﬁve thousand, only ﬁfteen hundred men had the 
vote, and the patriciate thought this system too democratic. As late as 1762, Rousseau voiced 
his concern about Genevan men’s political apathy and lack of interest in their own political 
rights. Expanding the vote to include women was simply not on anyone’s mind in Geneva at 
the time. Still, one might want to speculate why Rousseau, who was such an original and 
creative thinker in other ways, did not break out of the mental conﬁnes of his time and place 
and advocate active political rights for women. In other words, why did Rousseau not become 
Condorcet? To answer this question fairly and responsibly one would have to take into account 
many factors; “misogyny,” however, is not one of them. 
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